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Abstract 
At present the basic intellectual aim of academic inquiry is to improve knowledge. Much 
of the structure, the whole character, of academic inquiry, in universities all over the 
world, is shaped by the adoption of this as the basic intellectual aim. But, judged from the 
standpoint of making a contribution to human welfare, academic inquiry of this type is 
damagingly irrational. Three of four of the most elementary rules of rational problem-
solving are violated. A revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry is needed 
so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom, conceived of as the capacity to realize 
what is of value, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological 
know-how, but much else besides. This urgently needed revolution would affect every 
branch and aspect of the academic enterprise. 
 
 
Introduction 
Humanity is confronted by grave global problems.  Most serious of all, perhaps, there is 
the impending problem of global warming.  There is the problem of the progressive 
destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, with its concomitant 
devastating extinction of species.  There is the problem of war, over 100 million people 
having died in countless wars in the 20th century (which compares unfavourably with the 
12 million or so killed in wars during the 19th century).  There is the arms trade, the 
massive stockpiling of armaments, even by poor countries, and the ever-present threat of 
their use by terrorists or in war, whether the arms be conventional, chemical, biological 
or nuclear.  There is the sustained and profound injustice of immense differences of 
wealth across the globe, the industrially advanced first world of North America, Europe 
and elsewhere experiencing unprecedented wealth while something like a third of 
humanity live in conditions of poverty in the developing world, hungry, unemployed, 
without proper housing, health care, education, or even access to safe water.  There is the 
long-standing problem of the rapid growth of the world's population, especially 
pronounced in the poorest parts of the world, and adversely affecting efforts at 
development.  And there is the horror of the Aids epidemic, again far more terrible in the 
poorest parts of the world, devastating millions of lives, destroying families, and 
crippling economies. 
 
From Knowledge to Wisdom 
What can be done in response to global problems such as these?  There are a multitude of 
things that can be done, and are being done, with varying amounts of success.  Here, I 
wish to concentrate on just one thing that could be done, which would go to the heart of 
the above global problems, and to the heart of our apparent current incapacity to respond 
adequately to these problems.   
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     We need to bring about a wholesale, structural revolution in the aims and methods, the 
entire intellectual and institutional character of academic inquiry.  At present academic 
inquiry is devoted to acquiring knowledge.  The idea is to acquire knowledge, and then 
apply it to help solve social problems.  This needs to change, so that the basic aim 
becomes to seek and promote wisdom – wisdom being understood to be the capacity to 
realize what is of value in life for oneself and others (and thus including knowledge, 
know-how and understanding). Instead of devoting itself primarily to solving problems of 
knowledge, academic inquiry needs to give intellectual priority to the task of discovering 
possible solutions to problems of living. 
       I have two arguments in support of this contention.  The first appeals to problem-
solving rationality, the second to aim-pursuing rationality. 
  
The Crisis of Science without Wisdom 
It may seem surprising that I should suggest that changing the aims and methods of 
academic inquiry would help us tackle the above global problems.  It is, however, of 
decisive importance to appreciate that all the above global problems have arisen because 
of a massive increase in scientific knowledge and technology without a concomitant 
increase in global wisdom.  Degradation of the environment due to industrialization and 
modern agriculture, global warming, the horrific number of people killed in war, the arms 
trade and the stockpiling of modern armaments, the immense differences in the wealth of 
populations across the globe, rapid population growth: all these have been made possible 
by the rapid growth of science and technology since the birth of modern science in the 
17th century.  Modern science and technology are even implicated in the rapid spread of 
Aids, Aids being spread by modern travel. 
     That the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and technological know-how should 
have these kinds of consequence is all but inevitable.  Scientific and technological 
progress massively increase our power to act: in the absence of wisdom, this will have 
beneficial consequences, but will also have harmful ones, whether intended, as in war, or 
unforeseen and unintended (initially at least), as in environmental degradation.  As long 
as we lacked modern science, lack of wisdom did not matter too much: our power to 
wreak havoc on the planet and each other was limited.  Now that our power to act has 
been so massively enhanced by modern science and technology, global wisdom has 
become, not a luxury, but a necessity. 
     The crisis of our times, in short – the crisis behind all the others – is the crisis of 
science without wisdom.  Having a kind of academic inquiry that is, by and large, 
restricted to acquiring knowledge can only serve to intensify this crisis.  Changing the 
nature of science, and of academic inquiry more generally, is the key intellectual and 
institutional change that we need to make in order to come to grips with our global 
problems – above all, the global problem behind all the others, the crisis of ever-
increasing technological power in the absence of wisdom.  We urgently need a new kind 
of academic inquiry that gives intellectual priority to promoting the growth of global 
wisdom. 
 
The Damaging Irrationality of Knowledge-Inquiry 
There are those who blame scientific rationality for our problems, but that profoundly 
misses the point.  What we are suffering from is not too much reason, but not enough.  
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Scientific rationality, so-called, is actually a species of damaging irrationality 
masquerading as rationality.  Academic inquiry as it mostly exists at present, devoted to 
the growth of knowledge and technological know-how – knowledge-inquiry I shall call it 
– is actually profoundly irrational when judged from the standpoint of contributing to 
human welfare.  Judged from this all-important standpoint, knowledge-inquiry violates 
three of the four most elementary, uncontroversial rules of reason that one can conceive 
of (to be indicated in a moment).  And that knowledge-inquiry is grossly irrational in this 
way has everything to do with its tendency to generate the kind of global problems 
considered above.  Instead of false simulacra of reason, what we so urgently need is 
authentic reason devoted to the growth of wisdom. 
     Knowledge-inquiry demands that a sharp split be made between the social or 
humanitarian aims of inquiry and the intellectual aim.  The intellectual aim is to acquire 
knowledge of truth, nothing being presupposed about the truth.  Only those 
considerations may enter into the intellectual domain of inquiry relevant to the 
determination of truth – claims to knowledge, results of observation and experiment, 
arguments designed to establish truth or falsity.  Feelings and desires, values, ideals, 
political and religious views, expressions of hopes and fears, cries of pain, articulation of 
problems of living: all these must be ruthlessly excluded from the intellectual domain of 
inquiry as having no relevance to the pursuit of knowledge – although of course inquiry 
can seek to develop factual knowledge about these things, within psychology, sociology 
or anthropology.  Within natural science, an even more severe censorship system 
operates: an idea, in order to enter into the intellectual domain of science, must be an 
empirically testable claim to factual knowledge.   
     The basic idea of knowledge-inquiry, then, is this.  First, knowledge is to be acquired; 
then it can be applied to help solve social problems.  For this to work, authentic objective 
knowledge must be acquired.  Almost paradoxically, human values and aspirations must 
be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry so that genuine factual knowledge is 
acquired and inquiry can be of genuine human value, and can be capable of helping us 
realize our human aspirations.
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     This is the conception of inquiry which, I claim, violates reason in a wholesale, 
structural and damaging manner. 
     What do I mean by "reason"?  As I use the term here, rationality appeals to the idea 
that there are general methods, rules or strategies which, if put into practice, give us our 
best chance, other things being equal, of solving our problems, realizing our aims.  
Rationality is an aid to success, but does not guarantee success, and does not determine 
what needs to be done. 
     Four elementary rules of reason, alluded to above, are: 
 
(1) Articulate and seek to improve the articulation of the basic problem(s) to be solved. 
                                                 
1
 For a much more detailed exposition of knowledge-inquiry, or “the philosophy of knowledge”, 
see Maxwell (1984 or 2007, chapter 2).  For evidence that knowledge-inquiry prevails in 
academia, see Maxwell (1984 or 2007, chapter 6; 2000).  I do not claim that everything in 
academia accords with the edicts of knowledge-inquiry.  My claim is, rather, that this is the only 
candidate for rational inquiry in the public arena; it is the dominant view, exercising an all-
pervasive influence over academe.  Work that does not conform to its edicts has to struggle to 
survive. 
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(2) Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions. 
(3) When necessary, break up the basic problem to be solved into a number of specialized 
problems – preliminary, simpler, analogous, subordinate problems – (to be tackled in 
accordance with rules (1) and (2)), in an attempt to work gradually toward a solution to 
the basic problem to be solved. 
(4) Inter-connect attempts to solve the basic problem and specialized problems, so that 
basic problem-solving may guide, and be guided by, specialized problem-solving. 
 
     Two preliminary points now need to be made. 
     First, granted that academic inquiry has, as its fundamental aim, to help promote 
human welfare by intellectual and educational means,
2
 then the problems that inquiry 
fundamentally ought to try to help solve are problems of living, problems of action.  
From the standpoint of achieving what is of value in life, it is what we do, or refrain from 
doing, that ultimately matters.  Even where new knowledge and technological know-how 
are relevant to the achievement of what is of value – as it is in medicine or agriculture, 
for example – it is always what this new knowledge or technological know-how enables 
us to do that matters.  All the global problems discussed above require, for their 
resolution, not merely new knowledge, but rather new policies, new institutions, new 
ways of living.  Scientific knowledge, and associated technological know-how have, if 
anything, as we have seen, contributed to the creation of these problems in the first place.  
Thus problems of living – problems of poverty, ill-health, injustice, deprivation – are 
solved by what we do, or refrain from doing; they are not solved by the mere provision of 
knowledge (except when a problem of living is a problem of knowledge). 
     Second, in order to achieve what is of value in life more successfully than we do at 
present, we need to discover how to resolve conflicts and problems of living in more 
cooperatively rational ways than we do at present.  There is a spectrum of ways in which 
conflicts can be resolved, from murder or all out war at the violent end of the spectrum, 
via enslavement, threat of murder or war, threats of a less extreme kind, manipulation, 
bargaining, voting, to cooperative rationality at the other end of the spectrum, those 
involved seeking, by rational means, to arrive at that course of action which does the best 
justice to the interests of all those involved.  A basic task for a kind of academic inquiry 
that seeks to help promote human welfare must be to discover how conflict resolution can 
be moved away from the violent end of the spectrum towards the cooperatively rational 
end. 
                                                 
2
 This assumption may be challenged.  Does not academic inquiry seek knowledge for its own 
sake – it may be asked – whether it helps promote human welfare or not?  Elsewhere (Maxwell, 
2007, pp. 17-19, 70-5, 205-13) I have argued that wisdom-inquiry does better justice than 
knowledge-inquiry to both aspects of inquiry, pure and applied.  The basic aim of inquiry, 
according to wisdom-inquiry, is to help us realize what is of value in life, “realize” meaning both 
“apprehend” and “make real”.  “Realize” thus accommodates both aspects of inquiry, “pure” 
research or “knowledge pursued for its own sake” on the one hand, and technological or 
“mission-oriented” research on the other – both, ideally, seeking to contribute to what is of value 
in human life.  Wisdom-inquiry, like sight, is there to help us find our way around.  And like 
sight, wisdom-inquiry is of value to us in two ways: for its intrinsic value, and for practical 
purposes.  The first is almost more precious than the second. 
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     Granted this, and granted that the above four rules of reason are put into practice then, 
at the most fundamental level, academic inquiry needs to: 
 
 (1) Articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, personal, social and global 
problems of living that need to be solved if the quality of human life is to be enhanced 
(including those indicated above); 
(2) Propose and critically assess alternative possible solutions – alternative possible 
actions, policies, political programmes, legislative proposals, ideologies, philosophies of 
life. 
 
     In addition, of course, academic inquiry must: 
 
(3) Break up the basic problems of living into subordinate, specialized problems – in 
particular, specialized problems of knowledge and technology. 
(4) Inter-connect basic and specialized problem-solving.  
 
     Academic inquiry as it mostly exists at present puts (3) into practice to splendid effect.  
The intricate maze of specialized disciplines devoted to improving knowledge and 
technological know-how that go to make up current academic inquiry is the result.  But, 
disastrously, what we have at present, academic inquiry devoted primarily to improving 
knowledge, fails to put (1), (2) and (4) into practice.  In pursuing knowledge, academic 
inquiry may articulate problems of knowledge, and propose and critically assess possible 
solutions, possible claims to knowledge – factual theses, observational and experimental 
results, theories.  But, as we have seen, problems of knowledge are not (in general) 
problems of living; and solutions to problems of knowledge are not (in general) solutions 
to problems of living.  Insofar as academia does at present put (1) and (2) into practice, in 
departments of social science and policy studies, it does so only at the periphery, and not 
as its central, fundamental intellectual task. 
     In short, academic inquiry devoted primarily to the pursuit of knowledge, when 
construed as having the basic humanitarian aim of helping to enhance the quality of 
human life by intellectual means, fails to put the two most elementary rules of reason into 
practice (rules (1) and (2)).  Academic inquiry fails to do (at a fundamental level) what it 
most needs to do, namely (1) articulate problems of living, and (2) propose and critically 
assess possible solutions.  And furthermore, as a result of failing to explore the basic 
problems that need to be solved, academic inquiry cannot put the fourth rule of rational 
problem-solving into practice either, namely (4) inter-connect basic and specialized 
problem-solving.  As I have remarked, three of the four most elementary rules of rational 
problem-solving are violated.  (For a more detailed development of this argument see 
Maxwell, 1980, 1984 or 2007, 2004, 2010.) 
     This gross structural irrationality of contemporary academic inquiry has profoundly 
damaging consequences for humanity.  As I have pointed out above, granted that our aim 
is to contribute to human welfare by intellectual means, the basic problems we need to 
solve are problems of living, problems of action, not problems of knowledge.  In failing 
to give intellectual priority to problems of living, knowledge-inquiry fails to tackle what 
most needs to be tackled in order to contribute to human welfare.  In devoting itself to 
acquiring knowledge in a way that is unrelated to sustained concern about what 
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humanity's most urgent problems are, as a result of failing to put (1) and (2) into practice, 
and thus failing to put (4) into practice as well, the danger is that scientific and 
technological research will respond to the interests of the powerful and the wealthy, 
rather than to the interests of the poor, of those most in need.  Scientists, officially 
seeking knowledge of truth per se, have no official grounds for objecting if those who 
fund research – governments and industry – decide that the truth to be sought will reflect 
their interests, rather than the interests of the world’s poor.  And priorities of scientific 
research, globally, do indeed reflect the interests of the first world, rather than those of 
the third world.
3
   
     Knowledge and technology successfully pursued in a way that is not rationally 
subordinated to the tackling of more fundamental problems of living, through the failure 
to put (1), (2) and (4) into practice, is bound to lead to the kind of global problems 
discussed above, problems that arise as a result of newly acquired powers to act being 
divorced from the ability to act wisely.  The creation of our current global problems, and 
our inability to respond adequately to these problems, has much to do, in other words, 
with the long-standing, rarely noticed, structural irrationality of our institutions and 
traditions of learning, devoted as they are to acquiring knowledge dissociated from 
learning how to tackle our problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways.  
Knowledge-inquiry, because of its irrationality, is designed to intensify, not help solve, 
our current global problems.
4
 
 
Wisdom-Inquiry 
At once the question arises: What would a kind of inquiry be like that is devoted, in a 
genuinely rational way, to promoting human welfare by intellectual means?  I shall call 
such a hypothetical kind of inquiry wisdom-inquiry, to stand in contrast to knowledge-
inquiry. 
     As a first step at characterizing wisdom-inquiry, we may take knowledge-inquiry (at 
its best) and modify it just sufficiently to ensure that all four elementary rules of rational 
problem-solving, indicated above, are built into its intellectual and institutional structure: 
see Figure 1. 
     The primary change that needs to be made is to ensure that academic inquiry 
implements rules (1) and (2).  It becomes the fundamental task of social inquiry and the 
humanities (1) to articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, our problems of 
living, and (2) to propose and critically assess possible solutions, from the standpoint of 
their practicality and desirability.  In particular, social inquiry has the task of discovering 
how conflicts may be resolved in less violent, more cooperatively rational ways.  It also 
has the task of promoting such tackling of problems of living in the social world beyond 
academe.  Social inquiry is, thus, not primarily social science, nor, primarily, concerned 
to acquire knowledge of the social world; its primary task is to promote more 
cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living in the social world.  Pursued in this 
way, social inquiry is intellectually more fundamental than the natural and technological  
 
                                                 
3
 Funds devoted, in the USA, UK and some other wealthy countries, to military research are 
especially disturbing: see Langley (2005) and Smith (2003). 
4
 See Maxwell (1984 or 2007, chapter 3) for a much more detailed discussion of the damaging 
social repercussions of knowledge-inquiry. 
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Figure 1: Wisdom-Inquiry Implementing Problem-Solving Rationality 
 
sciences, which tackle subordinate problems of knowledge, understanding and 
technology, in accordance with rule (3).  In Figure 1, implementation of rule (3) is  
represented by the specialized problem-solving of the natural, technological and formal 
sciences, and more specialized aspects of social inquiry and the humanities.  Rule (4) is  
represented by the two-way arrows linking fundamental and specialized problem-solving, 
each influencing the other. 
     One can go further.  According to this view, the thinking that we engage in as we live, 
in seeking to realize what is of value to us, is intellectually more fundamental than the 
whole of academic inquiry (which has, as its basic purpose, to help cooperatively rational 
thinking and problem-solving in life to flourish).  Academic thought emerges as a kind of 
specialization of personal and social thinking in life, the result of implementing rule (3); 
this means there needs to be a two-way interplay of ideas, arguments and experiences 
between the social world and academia, in accordance with rule (4).  This is represented, 
in figure 1, by the two-way arrows linking academic inquiry and the social world. 
     The natural and technological sciences need to recognize three domains of discussion: 
evidence, theory, and aims.  Discussion of aims seeks to identify that highly problematic 
region of overlap between that which is discoverable, and that which it is of value to 
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discover.  Discussion of what it is of value to discover interacts with social inquiry, in 
accordance with rule (4). 
 
The Enlightenment Programme  
So much for my first argument in support of wisdom-inquiry.  I come now to my second 
argument, which appeals to, and modifies, the Enlightenment programme of learning 
from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world. 
     In order to implement this programme properly, it is essential to get the following 
three steps right. 
 
1.  The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified. 
2.  These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully 
     applicable to any human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just applicable 
     to the endeavour of improving knowledge. 
3.  The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited 
     correctly in the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an 
     enlightened, wise, civilized world. 
 
     Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three points wrong.  And 
as a result these blunders, undetected and uncorrected, are built into the intellectual-
institutional structure of academia as it exists today.
5
 
     First, the philosophes failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of 
natural science.  From D’Alembert in the 18th century to Popper in the 20th (Popper, 
1959, 1963), the widely held view, amongst both scientists and philosophers, has been 
(and continues to be) that science proceeds by assessing theories impartially in the light 
of evidence, no permanent assumption being accepted by science about the universe 
independently of evidence.  But this standard empiricist view is untenable.  If taken 
literally, it would instantly bring science to a standstill. For, given any accepted theory of 
physics, T,  Newtonian theory say, or quantum theory, endlessly many empirically more 
successful rivals can be concocted which agree with T about observed phenomena but 
disagree arbitrarily about some unobserved phenomena.  Physics would be drowned in an 
ocean of such empirically more successful rival theories.   
     In practice, these rivals are excluded because they are disastrously disunified.  Two 
considerations govern acceptance of theories in physics: empirical success and unity.  But 
in persistently accepting unified theories, to the extent of rejecting disunified rivals that 
are just as, or even more, empirically successful, physics makes a big persistent 
assumption about the universe.  The universe is such that all disunified theories are false.  
                                                 
5
 The blunders of the philosophes are not entirely undetected.  Karl Popper, in his first four 
works, makes substantial improvements to the traditional Enlightenment programme (although 
Popper does not himself present his work in this fashion).  Popper first improves traditional 
conceptions of the progress-achieving methods of science (Popper, 1959).  This conception, 
falsificationism, is then generalized to become critical rationalism.  This is then applied to social, 
political and philosophical problems (Popper, 1961, 1962, 1963).  The version of the 
Enlightenment programme about to be outlined here can be regarded as a radical improvement of 
Popper’s version: see Maxwell (2004, chapter 3).   
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It has some kind of unified dynamic structure.  It is physically comprehensible in the 
sense that explanations for phenomena exist to be discovered. 
     But this untestable (and thus metaphysical) assumption that the universe is 
comprehensible is profoundly problematic.  Science is obliged to assume, but does not 
know, that the universe is comprehensible.  Much less does it know that the universe is 
comprehensible in this or that way.  A glance at the history of physics reveals that ideas 
have changed dramatically over time.  In the 17
th
 century there was the idea that the 
universe consists of corpuscles, minute billiard balls, which interact only by contact.  
This gave way to the idea that the universe consists of point-particles surrounded by 
rigid, spherically symmetrical fields of force, which in turn gave way to the idea that 
there is one unified self-interacting field, varying smoothly throughout space and time.  
Nowadays we have the idea that everything is made up of minute quantum strings 
embedded in ten or eleven dimensions of space-time.  Some kind of assumption along 
these lines must be made but, given the historical record, and given that any such 
assumption concerns the ultimate nature of the universe, that of which we are most 
ignorant, it is only reasonable to conclude that it is almost bound to be false. 
     The way to overcome this fundamental dilemma inherent in the scientific enterprise is 
to construe physics as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the 
comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting less and 
less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming more and more likely to be true: see 
figure 2.  In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed 
assumptions and associated methods is created within which much more substantial and 
problematic assumptions and associated methods can be changed, and indeed improved, 
as scientific knowledge improves.  Put another way, a framework of relatively unspecific,  
unproblematic, fixed aims and methods is created within which much more specific and 
problematic aims and methods evolve as scientific knowledge evolves.  (A basic aim of 
science is to discover in what precise way the universe is comprehensible, this aim 
evolving as assumptions about comprehensibility evolve.)  There is positive feedback 
between improving knowledge, and improving aims-and-methods, improving 
knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge.  This is the nub of scientific rationality,  
the methodological key to the unprecedented success of science.
6
  Science adapts its 
nature to what it discovers about the nature of the universe (see Maxwell, 1974, 1976, 
1984 or 2007, 1998, 2004, 2005). 
     So much for the first blunder of the traditional Enlightenment, and how to put it right. 
     Second, having failed to identify the methods of science correctly, the philosophes 
naturally failed to generalize these methods properly.  They failed to appreciate that the 
idea of representing the problematic aims (and associated methods) of science in the form 
of a hierarchy can be generalized and applied fruitfully to other worthwhile enterprises 
besides science.  Many other enterprises have problematic aims – problematic because 
                                                 
6
 Natural science has made such astonishing progress in improving knowledge and understanding 
of nature because it has put something like the hierarchical methodology, indicated here, into 
scientific practice.  Officially, however, scientists continue to hold the standard empiricist view 
that no untestable metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the 
universe are accepted as a part of scientific knowledge.  As I have argued elsewhere (Maxwell, 
2004, chapter 2), science would be even more successful, in a number of ways, if scientists 
adopted and explicitly implemented the hierarchical methodology indicated here. 
10 
aims conflict, and because what we seek may be unrealizable, undesirable, or both.  Such 
enterprises, with problematic aims, would benefit from employing a hierarchical 
methodology, generalized from that of science, thus making it possible to improve aims 
and methods as the enterprise proceeds.  There is the hope that, as a result of exploiting in 
life methods generalized from those employed with such success in science, some of the 
astonishing success of science might be exported into other worthwhile human 
endeavours, with problematic aims quite different from those of science.   
     Third, and most disastrously of all, the philosophes failed completely to try to apply 
such generalized, hierarchical progress-achieving methods to the immense, and 
profoundly problematic enterprise of  making social progress towards an enlightened, 
wise world.  The aim of such an enterprise is notoriously problematic.  For all sorts of 
reasons, what constitutes a good world, an enlightened, wise or civilized world, attainable 
 
Figure 2: Hierarchical Conception of Science 
 
11 
and genuinely desirable, must be inherently and permanently problematic.
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  Here, above 
all, it is essential to employ the generalized version of the hierarchical, progress-
achieving methods of science, designed specifically to facilitate progress when basic aims 
are problematic: see Figure 3.  It is just this that the philosophes failed to do.  Instead of 
applying the hierarchical methodology to social life, the philosophes sought to apply a 
seriously defective conception of scientific method to social science, to the task of 
making progress towards, not a better world, but to better knowledge of social 
phenomena.  And this ancient blunder is still built into the institutional and intellectual 
structure of academia today, inherent in the current character of social science (Maxwell, 
1984 or 2007, chapters 3, 6 and 7). 
     Properly implemented, in short, the Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific 
progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world would involve 
developing social inquiry, not as social science, but as social methodology, or social 
philosophy.  A basic task would be to get into personal and social life, and into other 
institutions besides that of science – into government, industry, agriculture, commerce, 
the media, law, education, international relations – hierarchical, progress-achieving 
methods (designed to improve problematic aims) arrived at by generalizing the methods 
of science.  A basic task for academic inquiry as a whole would be to help humanity learn 
how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just, cooperatively rational 
ways than at present.  This task would be intellectually more fundamental than the 
scientific task of acquiring knowledge.  Social inquiry would be intellectually more 
fundamental than physics.  Academia would be a kind of people’s civil service, doing 
openly for the public what actual civil services are supposed to do in secret for 
governments.  Academia would have just sufficient power (but no more) to retain its 
independence from government, industry, the press, public opinion, and other centres of 
power and influence in the social world.  It would seek to learn from, educate, and argue 
with the great social world beyond, but would not dictate.  Academic thought would be 
pursued as a specialized, subordinate part of what is really important  
and fundamental: the thinking that goes on, individually, socially and institutionally, in 
the social world, guiding individual, social and institutional actions and life.  The 
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 There are a number of ways of highlighting the inherently problematic character of the aim of 
creating civilization.  People have very different ideas as to what does constitute civilization.  
Most views about what constitutes Utopia, an ideally civilized society, have been unrealizable 
and profoundly undesirable.  People's interests, values and ideals clash.  Even values that, one 
may hold, ought to be a part of civilization may clash.  Thus freedom and equality, even though 
inter-related, may nevertheless clash.  It would be an odd notion of individual freedom which 
held that freedom was for some, and not for others; and yet if equality is pursued too single-
mindedly this will undermine individual freedom, and will even undermine equality, in that a 
privileged class will be required to enforce equality on the rest, as in the old Soviet Union.  A 
basic aim of legislation for civilization, we may well hold, ought to be increase freedom by 
restricting it: this brings out the inherently problematic, paradoxical character of the aim of 
achieving civilization.  One thinker who has stressed the inherently problematic, contradictory 
character of the idea of civilization is Isaiah Berlin; see, for example, Berlin (1980, pp. 74-9).  
Berlin thought the problem could not be solved; I, on the contrary, hold that the hierarchical 
methodology indicated here provides us with the means to learn how to improve our solution to it 
in real life. 
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fundamental intellectual and humanitarian aim of inquiry would be to help humanity 
acquire wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize (apprehend and create) what is of 
value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge and technological 
know-how but much else besides. 
     One outcome of getting into social and institutional life the kind of aim-evolving, 
hierarchical methodology indicated above, generalized from science, is that it becomes 
possible for us to develop and assess rival philosophies of life as a part of social life, 
somewhat as theories are developed and assessed within science.  Such a hierarchical 
methodology provides a framework within which competing views about what our aims 
and methods in life should be – competing religious, political and moral views – may be 
cooperatively assessed and tested against broadly agreed, unspecific aims (high up in the 
hierarchy of aims) and the experience of personal and social life. There is the possibility of 
cooperatively and progressively improving such philosophies of life (views about what is of 
value in life and how it is to be achieved) much as theories are cooperatively and progressively 
improved in science. In science, ideally, theories are critically assessed with respect to each 
other, with respect to metaphysical ideas concerning the comprehensibility of the universe, 
and with respect to experience (observational and experimental results). In a somewhat 
analogous way, diverse philosophies of life may be critically assessed with respect to each 
other, with respect to relatively uncontroversial, agreed ideas about aims and what is of 
value, and with respect to experience – what we do, achieve, fail to achieve, enjoy and 
suffer – the aim being to improve philosophies of life (and more specific philosophies of more 
specific enterprises within life such as government, education or art) so that they offer greater 
help with the realization of what is of value in life.  This hierarchical methodology is 
especially relevant to the task of resolving conflicts about aims and ideals, as it helps 
disentangle agreement (high up in the hierarchy) and disagreement (more likely to be low 
down in the hierarchy). 
     Wisdom-inquiry, because of its greater rigour, has intellectual standards that are, in 
important respects, different from those of knowledge-inquiry.  Whereas knowledge-
inquiry demands that emotions and desires, values, human ideals and aspirations, 
philosophies of life be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry, wisdom-inquiry 
requires that they be included.  In order to discover what is of value in life it is essential 
that we attend to our feelings and desires.  But not everything we desire is desirable, and 
not everything that feels good is good.  Feelings, desires and values need to be subjected 
to critical scrutiny.  And of course feelings, desires and values must not be permitted to 
influence judgements of factual truth and falsity.  Wisdom-inquiry embodies a synthesis 
of traditional Rationalism and Romanticism.  It includes elements from both, and it 
improves on both.  It incorporates Romantic ideals of integrity, having to do with 
motivational and emotional honesty, honesty about desires and aims; and at the same time 
it incorporates traditional Rationalist ideals of integrity, having to do with respect for 
objective fact, knowledge, and valid argument. Traditional Rationalism takes its 
inspiration from science and method; Romanticism takes its inspiration from art, from 
imagination, and from passion.  Wisdom-inquiry holds art to have a fundamental rational 
role in inquiry, in revealing what is of value, and unmasking false values; but science, 
too, is of fundamental importance.  What we need, for wisdom, is an interplay of 
sceptical rationality and emotion, an interplay of mind and heart, so that we may develop  
13 
 
mindful hearts and heartfelt minds. It is time we healed the great rift in our culture, so 
graphically depicted by Snow (1986). 
      All in all, if the Enlightenment revolution had been carried through properly, the three 
steps indicated above being correctly implemented, the outcome would have been a kind 
of academic inquiry very different from what we have at present, inquiry devoted 
primarily to the intellectual aim of acquiring knowledge.   
 
Conclusion 
Humanity is in deep trouble.  We urgently need to learn how to make progress towards a 
wiser, more civilized world.  This in turn requires that we possess traditions and 
institutions of learning rationally designed – well designed – to help us achieve this end.  
It is just this that we do not have at present.  What we have instead is natural science and, 
more broadly, inquiry devoted to acquiring knowledge.  Judged from the standpoint of 
helping us create a better world, knowledge-inquiry of this type is dangerously and 
damagingly irrational.  We need to bring about a major intellectual and institutional 
Figure 3: Hierarchical Social Methodology Generalized from Science  
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revolution in the aims and methods of inquiry, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-
inquiry.  Almost every branch and aspect of academic inquiry needs to change. 
     This revolution – intellectual, institutional and cultural – if it ever comes about, will 
be comparable in its long-term impact to that of the Renaissance, the scientific 
revolution, or the Enlightenment.  The outcome will be traditions and institutions of 
learning rationally designed to help us acquire wisdom.  There are a few scattered signs 
that this intellectual revolution, from knowledge to wisdom, is already under way. It will 
need, however, much wider cooperative support – from scientists, scholars, students, 
research councils, university administrators, vice chancellors, teachers, the media and the 
general public – if it is to become anything more than what it is at present, a fragmentary 
and often impotent movement of protest and opposition, often at odds with itself, 
exercising little influence on the main body of academic work.  I can hardly imagine any 
more important work for anyone associated with academia than, in teaching, learning and 
research, to help promote this revolution. 
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